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THE CONTINUOUS MATERIALITY OF BLOCKCHAIN 
Alesja Serada 
The University of Vaasa, PL 700, 65101 Vaasa, Finland 
Both cryptocurrency researchers and early adopters of cryptocurrencies agree that they possess a special kind of 
materiality, based on the laborious productive process of digital ‘mining’ [1]. This idea first appears in the Bitcoin White 
Paper [2] that encourages Bitcoin adopters to construct and justify its value in metaphoric comparison to gold mining. In 
this paper, I explore three material aspects of blockchain: physical infrastructure, human language and computer code. I 
apply the concept of 'continuous materiality' [3] to show how these three aspects interact in practical implementations of 
blockchain such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. I start from the concept of ‘digital metallism’ that stands for ‘fundamental 
value’ of cryptocurrencies, and end with the move of Ethereum to ‘proof-of-stake’, partially as a countermeasure against 
‘evil miners’. I conclude that ignoring material aspects of blockchain technology can only further problematize 
complicated relations between their technical, semiotic and social materiality. 
1. Introduction 
Blockchain technology further complicates the 
already problematic divide between software and 
hardware. In a way, it is an answer to ‘digital 
immateriality’ of online services and transactions. 
Digitization of records, including accounting journals 
and ledgers, has led to new challenges to prove their 
authenticity. A cryptographic record on blockchain 
has been proposed as one of such solutions, because 
it is validated by an unintermediated, even if often 
costly, consensus between many participants of a 
network.  
Architecture of a blockchain platform does not require 
a central server to keep the records. Results of each 
transaction are validated by a majority of nodes in a 
network or by a reasonable share of selected 
representatives on a digital platform, and then 
recorded as the next block on each node. In the 
common process of validation, computing takes place 
at many machines at once, which makes blockchain 
platforms particularly robust and, ideally, affords their 
democratic self-regulation. For example, Filipe 
Calvão believes that "the work of digital mining... 
enables the formation of democratic communities" 
[1], and compares mining pools to trade unions, even 
though empirical results of his own research show 
heavy ‘capitalization’ of industrial ‘mining’.  
Material conditions of blockchain platforms have been 
the subject of many researchers since the early years 
of Bitcoin studies [4]–[6]. Many turn to the ‘material’ 
value of cryptocurrencies: for instance, in their studies 
of early Bitcoin hype, Garcia et al. suggest that the 
“fundamental value” of one Bitcoin equals at least the 
cost of its production [4]. From this perspective, the 
exchange price of mined cryptocurrencies is tied to 
the material conditions of ‘mining’, although this 
existing relation has only been further complicated 
with time. At an early stage of blockchain adoption, 
Henrik Karlstrøm calls for more attention to the 
'material embeddedness' of Bitcoin, or its connection 
to specific material and institutional arrangements [5]. 
This paper relies on development and specification of 
this approach within technology studies. 
Taking the previous research in blockchain studies 
into account, I counterpose it with factual 
implementations of roadmaps for Bitcoin and 
Ethereum. To integrate the history and the genealogy 
of blockchain into a wider perspective of information 
and communication technologies, I turn to the 
“material history of bits” [7], and to the critical study of 
‘continuous materiality’ of computer code [3]. 
Blockchain-related discourse has many features of 
‘rupture talk’ [8], and I propose to look at the specific 
material conditions of decentralization that may have 
been overshadowed by it. 
2. The Rigs, the Fees and the Lags of Blockchain 
Technology 
There are many ways to build a blockchain solution 
today, and most of them do not require dedicated 
hardware. Still, the initial ‘proof-of-work’ protocol 
popularized by Bitcoin and the first version Ethereum, 
involves so-called collective ‘mining’ of a 
cryptographic hash. The material technology behind 
blockchain solutions is represented by physical 'rigs' 
- stacks of equipment for industrial ‘mining’ - and the 
non-trivial amount of electricity spent on it.  
Initially, bitcoins were ‘mined’ on CPUs of personal 
computers. Since around 2011, mining was mostly 
performed on dedicated GPUs due to growing 
complexity of calculations [6]. Some miners’ 
continued to use GPUs late into 2017, mostly to mine 
various (and often highly speculative) ‘altcoins’ [1], 
but production of bitcoins has mostly moved to 
industrial facilities as early as in 2013 [5].  
A basic unit for professional or industrial mining is a 
dedicated ASIC (Application Specific Integrated 
Circuit), also simply called a 'miner'. A large farm can 
have thousands if not hundreds of thousands, of 
ASICs. As an illustration, a documentary from a 
cryptocurrency-related YouTube channel VoskCoin 
invites its viewers to visit one of the biggest farming 
facilities in the USA, located in North Carolina. Its 
power is around 100 megawatt, which is comparable 
to a large data center. Around 90% of the mining 
equipment is owned by clients who rent the facility. As 
of 2020, some of them still use GPUs, due to their 
relatively low cost.  [9]. The software company that 
owns the farm states that it uses 80% renewable 
energy; however, the magnitude of industrial mining 
defies the notion of energetic efficiency. 
At a certain point in history, industrial ‘mining’ 
expanded to an almost planetary scale. Same as 
major data centers and server farms, economic 
efficiency of big ‘mining’ farms depends on the 
climate at their location. In addition to that, they 
gravitate towards cheap sources of energy such as 
hydroelectric power plants in geologically diverse 
regions. In the golden days of Bitcoin, a lightweight 
version of its software could run on any personal 
computer; now, the principal hardware is to be found 
among picturesque mountains of China, not far from 
the controversial Three Gorges Dam. On certain 
days, the speed of a cryptocurrency transaction 
literally depends on the weather in China. Mining 
capacities are regularly damaged by seasonal floods 
[10], [11]. Although not directly related to material 
conditions, we should also consider the sociopolitical 
environment of China, where cryptocurrencies have 
been effectively banned since 2017 [12], but the state 
simultaneously heavily invested in blockchain 
technologies and even designed a state digital 
currency [13]. 
The unprecedented energetic cost of Bitcoin 
validation has led to very material ecological 
concerns. “You are a miner, you are destroying the 
world!” - the host of VoskCoin playfully teases the 
farm keeper in the documentary [9]. The inefficiency 
of this process is so jarring that Alexander Galloway 
even compares cryptocurrency farms to the XIX 
century steam machines “that run on heat and 
energy” [14].  In his critical essay Anti-Computer, he 
applies the Marxist perspective to Bitcoin farms, 
which makes them “essentially large batteries for 
value” in the same way as the machines used to 
produce steel or textile: both “burn fuel to release 
value” (ibid.). Symbolically, the farm visited by 
VoskCoin occupies several buildings of a former 
textile factory  [9]. This makes Bitcoin rather 
steampunk than cyberpunk. 
3. ‘Digital Metallism’: the Semiotic Materiality of 
Bitcoin 
 ‘Bitcoin mining’ is a primary metaphor used to explain 
how a cryptocurrency works. This rhetorical tool first 
appears in the Bitcoin White Paper: “The steady 
addition of a constant of amount of new coins is 
analogous to gold miners expending resources to add 
gold to circulation” [2]. The metaphor defined the 
language of blockchain adopters for the years to 
come, spawned countless memes and even 
influenced narratives of many ‘crypto games’ such as 
Ether Kingdoms and My CryptoHeroes, which could 
be considered educational in this regard. 
Rhetorically, the metaphor of ‘mining’ has everything 
to do with material existence and circulation of gold 
as a metal. Building from Nakamoto’s statements, 
blockchain aficionados justify the fundamental value 
of Bitcoin and several other cryptocurrencies by 
referring to their limited supply and presumable 
scarcity, and comparing them to the ‘gold standard’. 
Comparison of Bitcoin to gold is sometimes 
dramatically reversed, so gold is compared to Bitcoin 
[15], especially after the recent surge in price of the 
former. 
Such comparisons highlight a specific form of an 
‘authentic’ value that also relies on natural scarcity. 
However, it is problematic to speak about the scarcity 
of digital tokens that are mined in large quantities on 
an industrial level, can be divided into almost infinitely 
small parts and, most importantly, have very little use 
value outside of professional trading. The problem of 
‘fundamental value’ of cryptocurrencies circulates not 
only in research circles [4], but also in online 
communities of traders and early adopters. According 
to their views, Bitcoin, as well as many following 
cryptocurrencies, derives its value from the 
computational work put into ‘mining’. Semiotically, 
mining is “an algorithmic imitation of the limited supply 
of metallic currencies” such as golden dollar coins 
[15, p. 72]. Elizabeth Ferry even noticed that the 
rhetorics of Bitcoin adherents is similar to those who 
invest in physical gold, especially in their political 
stance. This principle of value creation in 
cryptocurrencies has been described as ‘digital 
metallism’ [6].  
Does ‘digital metallism’ make Bitcoin more material? 
Even though it is a discursive construction, it has real 
implications in the real world. It creates an additional 
level of conceptualizing and comprehending 
blockchains. The current level of public 
understanding would be impossible without this 
interpretive discourse.  
Blockchain technologies are often seen as too 
complex and difficult to comprehend. This is often 
mentioned as the reason for relatively slow adoption, 
although the absence of actual use cases might be 
the real reason. However, metaphoric interpretation 
affects not just the human users and developers of 
blockchain applications, but also the machines they 
build, the money they invest, and the code they write. 
Looking at countless visual and verbal 
representations of ‘miners’ in online discussions, we 
cannot simply discard their image as ‘immaterial’, 
even knowing that the real owners and workers of 
cryptocurrency farms are nothing like that. 
4. How ‘Miners’ Became Evil: Blockchain as a 
Sociotechnical Object 
Contrary to its initial ambition as a global currency, 
the current design of Bitcoin does not allow for 
scalability, which is an inherent problem of 
blockchains in general. This failure of the seemingly 
immaterial code involves not only limitations of 
hardware, but also existing socioeconomic 
arrangements. One simple example is storage, even 
though it is not as obvious as processing power. 
Hosting full nodes, which would participate in the 
global verification process, would require more and 
more storage: as of August 2020, recommended disk 
space for hosting a full node is 350 Gb [16]. Some 
voices in the community would point out that the size 
of a full node would eventually surpass the technical 
capacities of an ordinary Bitcoin user and leave 
verification to a dedicated and wealthy few. Exactly 
this is likely to happen to the second major 
cryptocurrency, Ether. 
The block size problem is the most discussed 
scalability problem of Bitcoin. The size of a single 
block that contains records of new transactions is 
limited to 1 Mb. This limits the number of transactions 
that can be performed and verified throughout the 
whole network. A number of solutions have been 
presented since 2015, but the problem generally 
remains unsolved due to the lack of consensus 
between developers, miners, investors and other 
representatives of the community [17]. Unfortunately, 
all efforts to establish a democratic procedure for 
reasonable decision-making in the Bitcoin community 
were futile. 
The impressive scale of the scalability debate does 
not allow to follow it in this paper, but I would like to 
draw attention to ‘miners’ who unexpectedly 
appeared as independent social agents in the 
dramatic process of Bitcoin infrastructuring [18]. 
‘Miners’, or, more specifically, owners of facilities for 
industrial mining, became important actors behind 
decentralization after the rapid industrialisation and 
the following centralization of Bitcoin mining. Also, 
this is when ‘miners’ became ‘evil’ in ordinary 
discourse of blockchain adopters. 
The initial vision of ‘miners’ among Bitcoin portrays 
them as agents of digital democracy. Miners not only 
contribute to the algorithmic consensus on the validity 
of every next transaction, they also represent the 
interests of the Bitcoin community, accept or reject 
the changes to the code. This idea originates in 
Nakamoto’s writing: as of 2008, he suggested that 
“proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining 
representation in majority decision making. If the 
majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it 
could be subverted by anyone able to allocate many 
IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote” 
[2]. This idea quickly became outdated as mining 
moved to GPU rigs and then to industrial-level ASICs, 
and the computational power was organized in pools. 
The promise of decentralization has been broken 
many times since then [19]. Democracy or not, 
‘miners’ as social agents can influence decisions 
about the future of blockchain. 
Another event that involves the code, the hardware 
and the community is the ‘halving’ of Bitcoin. ‘Halving’ 
is decreasing a reward for mining in half. This is a pre-
programmed event that happens after mining every 
210,000 blocks. It also raises the ‘fundamental value’ 
of Bitcoin, as twice more resources are required to 
mine the same quantity of bitcoins [4]. It usually leads 
to a noticeable surge in Bitcoin price, although the 
consequences of mining are unique for each time. 
The difficulty of mining has been constantly growing 
since the introduction of Bitcoin, although it can be 
algorithmically adjusted to match the total mining 
power. After the reward to miners of Bitcoin had been 
halved on May 11, 2020, its volatility decreased and 
difficulty of mining increased [20], which led to 
concerns about economic unsustainability of ‘mining’. 
These concerns return every time the price of Bitcoin 
approaches its ‘fundamental value’, as it was during 
its crash in December 2018, when mining difficulty 
temporarily dropped -15% and many miners left the 
business [21]. Bitcoin still would be impossible to use 
without the work of miners. This work is becoming 
less and less rewarding, and relations between the 
market, the code and the hardware are still far from 
reaching a long-lasting equilibrium. 
5. The Challenges of Ethereum 
The Ethereum platform, fueled by the most used 
‘altcoin’ Ether, arrived in 2015 as a revitalizing 
solution to realize a variety of use cases on 
blockchain. It reached the limits of its scalability after 
5 years, effectively freezing all activities made 
possible by a massive and dedicated community of 
developers. As a response to this situation, in 
summer 2020, it is moving from proof-of-work, which 
required miners, to proof-of-stake where transactions 
are validated by cryptocurrency holders who own 
stakes worth at least 32 ETH per validator.  
The new platform, Ethereum 2.0, postulates energy 
efficiency as one of its major advantages - finally, 
ecological concerns were addressed - but it comes at 
the cost of partial centralization. Now validation of 
transactions and other matters that require 
consensus are under control of a limited group of 
wealthy individuals (32 ETH roughly amounted to 
USD12,000 since April 2020). The community-written 
resource EthHub suggests that the proof of stake is 
fairer than the proof of work: “$10 million of coins will 
get you exactly 10 times higher returns than $1 million 
of coins, without any additional disproportionate gains 
because at the higher level you can afford better 
mass-production equipment” [22]. This statement 
represents the platform economy of Ethereum as a 
‘fair game’ where everyone is rewarded proportionally 
to their input. It still remains blind to the fact that the 
initial distribution of wealth may not have granted 
most Ether to the most honest, or even the most 
reasonable individuals. 
As such, the proof-of-stake protocol goes against the 
initial crypto-anarchist beliefs of Bitcoin adopters, 
because it replaces democracy with plutocracy. This 
also affects miners on both industrial and ‘artisan’ 
scale: even before the staking of Ethereum, Calvão 
suggested that “private-led blockchain-based 
initiatives based on the stake in the network may push 
small-scale (crypto) miners and, by extension, 
artisanal miners out of the system of rewards and 
incentives in place” [1]. However, it is still presented 
as a measure against centralization in the discourse 
of Ethereum supporters, mostly because the proof-of-
stake protocol reduces involvement of big ‘mining’ 
companies in decision-making and safeguards 
against 51% attacks.  
The algorithmic basis of value is also affected. 
Ethereum 2.0 allows ‘sharding’, or breaking down 
blocks. It decreases demand for Ether to fuel 
transactions on Ethereum, which leads to concerns 
about its artificial scarcity. However, the exchange 
rate of Ethereum to Bitcoin is on the rise in 2020: 
more importantly, Ethereum 2.0 affords passive 
income by hosting the nodes with the locked value of 
32ETH or more, which means more predictable return 
of investments in the long run. 
Finally, let us look at the physical materiality of 
Ethereum 2.0. Hosting a node requires a server that 
remains online 24/7. Of course, it can be a rented 
server, but the usual rhetorics of ‘the cloud’ should not 
prevent us from remembering that even so-called 
‘cloud services’ are not hosted in the thin air. To the 
contrary, they usually require large scale server 
farms, as in the case of the leading service from 
Amazon. Even though such facilities are much more 
energy saving, they are still basically the same kind 
of ‘power plants’ as ‘mining farms’. 
6. ‘Continuous Materiality’ of Blockchain 
Exploration of technicalities behind the distributed 
architecture of Bitcoin, Ethereum and other 
blockchain solutions may make us wonder whether 
electronic communications have ever been 
‘immaterial’. Сomputer code does not exist without 
the hardware to run on, and it also needs people to 
make use of it. Actions of these people have material 
consequences in the real world, and this is also the 
side of blockchain technologies that is somehow 
underdeveloped due to limited adoption.  
Materiality of technology is seen as threefold in 
studies of technology and society. Firstly, it is material 
technology behind blockchain solutions: physical 
'rigs' and the electricity spent on ‘mining’. Secondly, it 
is the semiotic level that reveals itself in metaphors 
like 'mining' ground the code in material reality.  
Thirdly, practical implementations of blockchain 
become embedded into active human networks of 
early adopters, miners, developers, investors and 
other actors such as researchers (who sometimes go 
no further than the semiotic level). This corresponds 
to three definitions of materiality: matter, significance 
and practical instantiation [23]. The latter, which is the 
social dimension of materiality, describes how 
software exists as a part of a social practice that 
“compels people to follow the abstract plan” [23], for 
instance, to trade cryptocurrencies as a part of the 
real-world economy. 
‘Continuous materiality’ of electronic communications 
can be understood as multi-level amalgamation of 
computer code, human language and physical 
entities: “a wide spectrum of materiality activated by 
a hierarchy of codes” [3]. Such assemblages also 
include social codes of behavior, which becomes 
visible, for example, when Bitcoin developers blame 
miners for violating such code in their refusal to 
update the Bitcoin software. In the end, such 
arrangements become solidified in the legal code: 
acknowledgement of cryptocurrencies as a specific 
type of assets, and, in different areas of application, 
property rights and personal identification based on 
blockchain. This is how records on blockchain 
become hard institutional facts that directly define the 
rules for the material world. 
Eventually, before solidifying the code in legal and 
institutional relations, it is important to consider the 
basic level of its (im)materiality. The very real physical 
matter of decentralized calculations often remains 
hidden beyond the promise of decentralization. As 
Blanchette writes, "a focus on materiality highlights 
that computation is a mechanical process based on 
the limited resources of processing power, storage, 
and connectivity" [7, pp. 1042–1043]. These exact 
resources were exhausted by blockchain 
technologies in just over 10 years. This is another sad 
confirmation of Blanchette’s thesis that “Yet we today 
have neither technical language nor intuition for 
something akin to the tensility, durability, or density of 
computing resources” [7, p. 1055]. While 
decentralized blockchain records can account for 
great durability, the underlying infrastructure can 
never ensure the required plasticity and flexibility. Of 
course, there have always been rightful warnings 
about exactly this problem: as early as in 2013,  
Karlstrøm noticed that "the materially embedded 
features of the currency, such as its reliance on very 
specific physical technologies, can point towards an 
underlying tension within the rhetoric behind Bitcoin" 
[5]. This tension between the material and the 
discursive reality of blockchain has only intensified 
during the following five years of public adoption.  
Practical implementations of blockchain may rely on 
problematic assumptions that have more to do with 
the discourse than with the technology itself. For 
example, in a much publicized partnership with IBM, 
the national clearing house of Poland, Krajowa Izba 
Rozliczeniowa (KIR), developed a blockchain 
solution for ‘durable medium’ on blockchain [24], even 
though such records are still much more of a 
message that may or may not be delivered depending 
on the state of the network. To prevent unwanted 
disruptions, developers should consider that “the 
boundary of software is always affected by the 
limitation of hardware” [3]. 
Blockchain technologies are usually presented as 
‘disruptive’, which makes the blockchain discourse 
yet another example of ‘rupture talk’. It is not 
uncommon in the history of technology when “the 
sharp breaks proclaimed by elites masked profound 
continuities”[8, p. 692], and the rupture in fact 
‘conjugated’ the same sociotechnical relations it was 
supposed to abruptly end. The usual promise of 
cryptocurrencies to ‘bank the underbanked’ has 
evolved into an abundance of investment schemes 
for those who already had, or were lucky enough to 
quickly acquire, enough ‘digital wealth’ to invest. 
Metaphors are an excellent tool to understand new 
technologies and to form meaningful connections with 
them. However they should not replace the material 
reality that makes them work. For example, the 
metaphor of ‘cyberspace’ influences the way we 
envision the internet, sometimes in a confusing way. 
“‘Cyberspace’, in this sense, is conceived of as both 
an ethereal alternate dimension which is 
simultaneously infinite and everywhere (...), and as 
fixed in a distinct location, albeit a non-physical one 
(...)" [25, p. 179]. Such a view remains blind to the 
physical infrastructure of electronic networks, which 
is costly and often vulnerable. Another example is the 
discourse of ‘regulating cyberspace’, against which 
so many early blockchain adopters have argued, - 
and yet, the blockchain-related discourse never 
acknowledges the fact that blockchain platforms 
function within the existing (or non-existent, or 
temporarily unavailable) material infrastructures of 
the internet. 
7. Conclusion 
Does decentralization mean dematerialization? 
Could it be that, by taking the blockchain agenda at 
face value, we are following the same path as with 
still unfulfilled promises of ‘cyberspace’? Constraints 
and affordances of software can shape the material 
world “in much the same way as physical artifacts do” 
[23]. Software is nothing without hardware, and 
decentralization does not free the participants of an 
electronic network from material constraints. It merely 
obfuscates the role of hardware and material 
expenditures such as the cost of electric energy.  
The material aspect of digital currencies is well 
represented in ‘digital metallism’. Images of mining 
rigs resting under buzzling coolers represent the 
materiality of Bitcoin and allow to treat it as authentic 
‘digital gold’. However, time has shown that ‘digital 
metallism’ does not guarantee the future of digital 
currencies. Integrity of the network and authenticity of 
records on blockchain can be safeguarded by a sheer 
amount of computational power, but this is still not 
enough to impose integrity on the community or 
create value beyond expenditures. 
After all, blockchain networks are only a superficial 
layer over the existing internet infrastructure, Due to 
their unprecedented speed, electronic 
communications were expected to overcome the 
limitations of time and space, but laborious 
verification of data and the need to update it at each 
node have brought these limitations back into the 
equation. Almost unsolvable scalability issues are the 
final reminder about the fundamental fact that 
blockchain technologies are never ‘synchronous’, but 
inherently ‘historical’. While the data kept and 
transferred on blockchain is discrete, the time to 
calculate and verify the results is continuous, and 
usually very long. As a result, operations on 
blockchain tend to slow down to an almost full halt, as 
in the case of Ethereum, especially when ‘mining’ is a 
part of the process. Furthermore, blockchain 
platforms are simultaneously electronic and social 
networks, which brings interactions between 
embodied, and often very passionate, human agents 
into the equation. To avoid inefficiency and 
stagnation, developers and investors should not 
forget about material limitations of immaterial 
blockchains. The revolutionary and disruptive 
potential of electronic communications should be 
evaluated by taking technological, semiotic and social 
aspects into account. 
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